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In August 1992, with great fanfare, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1992). Now, five years and several
revisions later, only eleven states have approved the act, known
colloquially as "RUPA," and then usually with significant modifications.' At present, it appears likely that the substantial uniformity in
partnership law which existed for almost eighty years will be a thing of
the past and that many, if not most, states will refuse to adopt RUPA at
all. This essay examines the reasons for RUPA's lukewarm acceptance
and discusses the lessons that might be learned from the process in the
hope that future uniform lawmaking efforts will be more likely to
achieve their intended goal of uniformity.
I. BACKGROUND
The original version of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was
approved by the NCCUSL in 1914.' It was the joint result of Dean
James Barr Ames and, following his death, of William Draper Lewis
It is one of the most successful pieces of uniform legislation ever
drafted, having been adopted in forty-nine states (all except Louisiana).'
Furthermore, very few amendments were made by the states during the
adoption process so that it is almost completely uniform in content.' It
is a concise, highly conceptual act which left many details to be fleshed
out by the courts. This may be one reason for its longevity since it lends
itself to evolutionary change through the process of interpretation by the
courts. Thus, over eighty years of case law has developed under UPA
which has aided in clarification of the ambiguities. Further, due to the
1. The new act was referred to colloquially as "RUPA" throughout the drafting process,
but that term is not part of the title of the new act as officially approved by NCCUSL. For
convenience, the term "RUPA" will be used in this essay to distinguish the new act from the
original 1914 Uniform Partnership Act. The 1997 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part to 6 Uniform
Laws Annotated 1 (1995) states that RUPA has been adopted in the following states: Alabama
(1996), Arizona (1996), California (1996), Connecticut (effective 1997), Florida (1996), Montana
(1993), North Dakota (1996), Texas (1993), Virginia (1996), West Virginia (1995), and
Wyoming (1994). Montana, Texas, and Wyoming adopted an earlier version of RUPA. Also,
Colorado adopted RUPA in 1997, effective 1998. J.DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND
THE LLC: SELECTED STATUTES AND FORM AGREEMENT 31 (1997).
2. See UPA Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organization, Report: Should the Uniform PartnershipAct Be Revised?, 43 BUS.
LAW. 121, 122 (1987) [hereinafter Revision Subcommittee Report].
3. William D. Lewis, The Uniform PartnershipAct, 24 YALE L.J. 617 (1915).
4. See Uniform Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 1-2 (master ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991) (table)
(listing the adopting states).
5. J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Some Comments on the Latest
Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 727, 728 (1991).
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uniformity among the states, courts readily look to authority in other
jurisdictions as an aid in interpretation when authority in the forum
jurisdiction is lacking. The fact that the act has survived intact for such
a long period of time, despite major changes in the taxation laws and in
the popularity of various forms of business entities, testifies to its basic
soundness.
Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with various provisions gradually grew
to the point where an ABA subcommittee created to study the act finally
concluded in a 1986 report that UPA should be revised.6 The Subcommittee recommended a complete revision of UPA as opposed to
relatively minor "patching up" amendments. 7 In retrospect, this fateful
decision had two important detrimental effects. First, it considerably
lengthened the duration of the revision process. Second, it may have led
to the revision of many areas that the clamor for change was not strong
enough to justify, thus resulting in a more controversial act. The revision
subcommittee report proceeded through UPA section by section,
indicating areas where clarifying language or major modifications were
needed.' Had the NCCUSL Drafting Committee followed this report as
a model for its own revisions, the process almost certainly would have
been expedited.
In 1987, the NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee chaired by
Professor (later Dean) Donald Weidner of Florida State University Law
School.9 The American Bar Association appointed an advisory committee to assist the NCCUSL drafting committee.'0 Although the drafting
committee included many experienced and talented individuals, the
general expertise of those individuals was in the area of drafting uniform
legislation rather than in the law of partnership. 1 The ABA advisory
committee, however, included a number of practitioners with extensive
experience in the partnership area. 2 This led to considerable differences between the two committees and almost certainly delayed and
complicated the drafting process. 3 The project, which commenced in
1987, continued for five years and culminated in the approval of the

6. See Revision Subcommittee Report, supra note 2, at 122, 184.
7. Id. at 123.
8. See id. at 127-84.
9. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS (CASES AND MATERIALS)

3 (5th ed. 1994).

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. For a description of the drafting process, see generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY
E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 383-84 (1997).

13. See HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 3.
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1992 version of RUPA. 4 Successive amended versions of RUPA
caused the process to continue for two more years until finally
concluding in 1994.
The first "final version" of the new statute known as the Uniform
Partnership Act (1992) was approved by the NCCUSL in 1992."
However, the ABA committee had many objections to it, and the statute
was plagued by a number of embarrassing drafting errors. 6 This led to
the approval of a number of revisions including the "Uniform Partnership Act (1992) with 1993 Amendments," the "Uniform Partnership Act
(1993)" and the "Uniform Partnership Act (1994)."'" Finally, after a
two-year period of stability, the 1996 amendments to the Uniform
Partnership Act (1994) were adopted, adding to the statute provisions
authorizing formation of "Limited Liability Partnerships."'"
As of early 1997, it appears probable that the era of uniformity in the
law of general partnerships is coming to a close. Texas adopted its own
partnership statute in 1993 which includes some provisions similar to
RUPA (1992) but has significant differences as well. 9 In 1993,
Wyoming and Montana specifically enacted RUPA (1992).20 Subsequently, Connecticut, Florida, and West Virginia enacted RUPA (1994)
but incorporated several significant amendments during the process of
adoption.2 As of October 1997, sixteen states had adopted RUPA in
one form or another.22 While it is possible that RUPA (1994) eventually will be widely adopted, the controversy surrounding some of its
substantive changes coupled with a general lack of compelling need for
the adoption of the revised act makes its widespread acceptance appear
unlikely. Before discussing the reasons why RUPA has not generated

14. See id. at 3-4.

15. See id. To avoid confusion with the original 1914 version of the Uniform Partnership
Act, the various versions of the Uniform Partnership Act adopted in 1992 through 1994 will be
referred to collectively in this essay as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act or "RUPA,"
although that term was dropped from the title of the act following the conclusion of the drafting
process. Footnote citations to the original Uniform Partnership Act are styled "U.P.A. (1969)."
Footnote citations to the Revised Uniform Partnership Act are styled "U.P.A. (1994)."
16. See HAMILTON, supra note 9, at 4.
17. See id.
18. See Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure Obligations of Partners Inter Se Under the
Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1994: Is the ContractarianRevolution Failing?,36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1559, 1561 n.13 (1995).
19. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at xvii.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Based on an e-mail report from Professor Donald Weidner, Reporter for the RUPA

Drafting Committee, Oct. 23, 1997.
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more enthusiasm, this essay examines briefly the major innovations
contained in RUPA.
II. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES MADE BY RUPA

A. Characterizationof Partnershipas an Entity
RUPA attempts to end the confusion over whether a partnership is
best characterized as an aggregate of its individual members or as a
distinct entity by expressly stating "[a] partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners."' Several specific provisions implement this philosophy. The act provides that: (1) property is partnership property when
acquired in the name of the partnership;24 (2) a partnership can sue or
be sued in its own name;' (3) a judgment against a partnership is not
necessarily a judgment against an individual partner;26 (4) a partnership
creditor must first levy unsuccessfully against the partnership's assets
before levying on the partner's individual property;27 and (5) a partnership no longer automatically dissolves due to a change in its membership, but rather the existing partnership may be continued if the
remaining partners elect to buy out the dissociating partner."
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that a partnership
formed under RUPA is a legal entity to the same extent as a corporation
because, even under RUPA, the partnership is still treated as an
aggregate in several important respects. Most importantly, the partnership, unlike a corporation, is not a taxable entity for federal income tax
purposes; indeed, the drafters were careful not'to take any action which
could jeopardize the pass-through tax status of the partnership and
limited partnership under the Internal Revenue Code.2 9 Also, as under
UPA, partners are personally liable for debts of the partnership; 0 the
only significant change under RUPA is that now a creditor must
normally exhaust her remedies against the partnership prior to pursuing
a partner's individual assets.3 Furthermore, although RUPA provides
that a partnership may be continued by the surviving partners following
dissociation of a partner, this occurs only if the surviving partners elect

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

U.P.A. § 201 (1994).
U.P.A. § 204(a)(1).
U.P.A. § 307(a).
U.P.A. § 307(c).
U.P.A. § 307(d).
U.P.A. §§ 701-801.
Revision Subcommittee Report, supra note 2. at 124.
U.P.A. § 306.
U.P.A. § 307(d).
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to do so; continuation is not automatic as with a corporation.32 Thus,
the much touted change to "entity status" in RUPA is, in many
important respects, more apparent than real.
B. Filing a Statement of PartnershipAuthority
One of the most helpful innovations of RUPA is its provision for the
voluntary filing by the partnership of a "statement of partnership
authority" indicating the authority of its partners to bind the partnership.33 This statement must include the names of partners authorized to
execute an instrument transferring title to real property held in the name
of the partnership, and it may state the authority, or limitations on the
authority, of some or all of the partners to enter into transactions on
behalf of the partnership.3
The statement of partnership authority provision constitutes one of
the real innovations of RUPA since it provides for a greater degree of
certainty than was previously possible in determining the authority of a
partner to act on behalf of the partnership. The uncertainties resulting
from the vague language of section 9 of the old UPA had led to much
litigation on the authority issue.35
C. Creditors' Rights to Execute Against
Non-PartnershipAssets
RUPA makes significant modifications concerning a partner's
liability for partnership debts. First, it provides that a partner's liability
is joint and several for all partnership debts, whether contractual or non32. U.P.A. §§ 701-801.
33. U.P.A. § 303.
34. U.P.A. § 303(a)(1)(iv)-(a)(2). Under RUPA, the effect of a filed statement differs
depending on whether the transaction involves real property or other types of transactions. See
U.P.A. § 303(d) & (e). With respect to real property, the effect of a properly executed and
recorded statement is virtually conclusive against a third party dealing with the partnership
unless the third party has actual knowledge that the partner executing the conveyance in fact has
no authority to do so. U.P.A. § 303(d)(2). This is consistent with the general rule of real
property conveyancing that charges third parties with knowledge of all documents of record in
the chain of title. Transactions not involving real property are treated differently. U.P.A. §
303(d)(1).
35. See U.P.A. § 9 (1914), which provides in part:
[t]he act of every partner... for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless
the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the
fact that he has no such authority.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss4/1

6

PARTNERSHIP
ACTDominance
(1994)
UNIFORM
Cohn:REVISED
Corporate
Natural
Law: The
of Justice in a Codified Wor

contractual in nature. 6 In contrast, under section 15 of UPA, liability
is joint and several for tort liabilities but joint for contractual claims. 7
Another, more controversial, change is the requirement that, prior to
levying against the assets of individual partners, the creditors must first
levy against all partnership assets or convince the court that such a levy,
if undertaken, would be unsuccessful. 38 This provision, while consistent
with the shift in emphasis to the entity status in RUPA, has troubled
many who argue that it may be inconsistent with the expectations of
creditors39 and possibly unconstitutional to the extent that RUPA is
retroactively applied to pre-existing partnerships.
D. FiduciaryDuties of Partners
One of the most controversial areas of RUPA is its treatment of
fiduciary duties. The key provision states that "It]he only fiduciary
duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other partners are the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and
(c).14 The specified duty of care provision simply restates the existing
36. U.P.A. § 306(a) (1994).
37. U.P.A. § 15 (1969). The pitfalls of joint liability are well-recognized and may impose
undesirable hurdles upon a deserving plaintiff, particularly in jurisdictions requiring that all
partners must be located and served in order to obtain jurisdiction. Another potential pitfall is
that, if all partners are not served in the original action, it may be held to be res judicata even
as to other partners not parties to the original action.
38. U.P.A. § 307(d) (1994). The drafting committee's justification for this change is that
it is consistent with the expectations of the partners that any obligations of the partnership first
be satisfied out of partnership assets and that the partners, in effect, serve only as guarantors of
partnership liabilities. Thus, requiring exhaustion of partnership assets before levying on
individual assets of the partner may save an individual the expense of paying a creditor and then
seeking indemnification from the partnership. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, at
304. The drafting committee also has argued that this change is not inconsistent with the
expectations of most creditors who typically look primarily at the partnership in deciding
whether to extend credit to the partnership.
The above arguments notwithstanding, the change has been criticized strongly by some on
the grounds that it will increase costs for tort creditors who previously could levy directly on
the assets of an individual partner of known solvency and who have no opportunity to contract
around the rule. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra, at 304. With respect to contract creditors,
to the extent that the rule is retroactive, it may defeat their expectations as well.
39. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime
Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45 (1993).
40. U.P.A. § 404(a) (1994). The issue of fiduciary duties of partners was dealt with
concisely in U.P.A. § 21(1) (1969) which provides simply:
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership
or from any use by him of its property.
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common law in providing that partners are only liable for gross
negligence or willful misconduct. 41 The duty of loyalty provisions are
more explicit. They include a general duty not to appropriate benefits
without copartner consent and specific duties to refrain from self dealing
or competition with the partnership. 42 These duties are stated to be the
only fiduciary duties owed by one partner to another.4 3
In addition, section 404(d) adds a new and undefined obligation of
"good faith and fair dealing," and section 103(b)(5) provides that this
duty may not be eliminated by the partnership agreement, although the
partners may determine the standards by which performance of the
obligation is to be met, as long as the standards are not "manifestly
unreasonable."' These provisions have been among the most controversial of the changes in RUPA for reasons discussed later.
E. PartnershipProperty
One of RUPA's strongest points is its simplified treatment of
partnership property.45 Consistent with its adoption of the entity theory
A large body of case law has grown up under this section dealing with almost every conceivable
type of breach of fiduciary duty.
41. U.P.A. § 404(c) (1994).
42. U.P.A. § 404(b).
43. U.P.A. § 404(b) (specifically limiting the duty of loyalty).
44. U.P.A. § 103(b)(5). This provision has been criticized because it subjects partners to
a new and undefined standard in addition to the duties of loyalty and care. These changes cast
doubt upon decades of case law interpreting a partner's fiduciary duty.
Another criticism of the fiduciary duty provisions of RUPA is that they cannot be waived
in all cases. Thus, RUPA may unduly deter an agent from exercising his discretion in a manner
that may benefit all partners. While RUPA does permit waivers of "specific types or categories
of activities" if not "manifestly unreasonable," this standard is so vague that it invites litigation
and thus may deter many transactions of potential benefit to an individual partner or to the
partnership.
RUPA § 404 has been criticized by others on the grounds that RUPA's exclusive list of
fiduciary duties may preclude the courts from applying the traditional flexibility of equity in
finding fiduciary duties in situations where a transaction does not seem to fall within the specific
categories listed in § 404.
45. In contrast, § 24(1) of U.P.A. (1969) provides that every partner has "rights in specific
partnership property." Section 25(1) elaborates by providing that a partner "is co-owner with his
partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership." Thus, the general
statement of ownership contained in § 24 is substantially qualified by § 25, which severely limits
the ordinary incidents of ownership in property by an individual partner and effectively lodges
most of the normal incidents of ownership in the partnership itself. This circuitous treatment is
necessary because UPA does not recognize the partnership as an entity, yet it recognizes that,
for the partnership to function successfully as a going concern, it is necessary to lodge most of
the normal incidents of ownership of property in the partnership rather than in the individual
partners. This has occasionally caused judicial confusion concerning just what rights an
individual partner has.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss4/1

8

UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP
(1994)
Cohn: REVISED
Corporate
Natural
Law: TheACT
Dominance
of Justice in a Codified Wor

of partnership, RUPA explicitly recognizes that the partnership, not the
partners, own the partnership property,' thus avoiding UPA's unnecessarily confusing concept of "tenancy in partnership."'47 Furthermore, the
act clarifies that a partner's interest in the partnership is similar to a
shareholder's stake in a corporation by providing that the only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner's interest in
receiving distributions." This should eliminate prior confusion concerning a partner's right to transfer his interest in specific partnership assets.
There also are helpful provisions designed to provide more certainty as
to whether property is or is not partnership property.49
F. Dissociation,Dissolution and Winding Up
One of the major innovations of RUPA is in its handling of the
dissolution and winding up process. RUPA attempts to distinguish
clearly between two possible tracks down which a partnership may
travel when a partner withdraws or dies. One leads to the winding up
and termination of the partnership and the other to continuation of the
partnership and purchase of the departing partner's share." Section 601
lists ten events which cause dissociation (the most common being the
death, withdrawal or expulsion of a partner) and contains other rules that
apply to all dissociations. Section 701 deals with cases in which the
partner's dissociation results in a buyout by the remaining partners.
Finally, section 801 deals with situations where the dissociation results
in a dissolution and winding up.

46. U.P.A. § 501 (1994). Section 402 of RUPA reinforces this by cutting partners off from
particular partnership assets-even those which they have contributed-by providing that a
partner has no right to receive a distribution in kind. U.P.A. § 402. Section 502 of RUPA makes
it clear that a partner's interest in a partnership is akin to a share of stock by providing that
"[t]he only transferable interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner's ...right to
receive distributions." U.P.A. § 502.
47. See discussion supra note 45.
48. U.P.A. § 502.
49. Property acquired in the name of the partnership is conclusively deemed to be
partnership property. U.P.A. §§ 203 & 204(a)(1). This promotes reliance on record title by both
the partnership and third parties. RUPA also contains helpful provisions designed to clarify when
property not acquired in the name of the partnership should be considered to be property of the
partnership. See U.P.A. § 204. Most importantly, it provides that property acquired with
partnership funds is presumptively partnership property. U.P.A. § 204(a). If it is acquired
otherwise, it is presumed to be property of the named partner, even though used for partnership
purposes. U.P.A. § 204(d). Further, § 303, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 32-34,
provides for the filing of a certificate of authority to clarify which partners may transfer
partnership property, which should be of significant help in increasing certainty in dealings
concerning partnership property.
50. See generally U.P.A. §§ 601-807 (concerning dissociation and winding up).
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Despite the rather elaborate restructuring of the sections dealing with
dissociation, dissolution and buyouts, the only major substantive change
that RUPA makes in this area is its provision that a partnership does not
automatically terminate on the death or withdrawal of a partner,5
something that can be done under UPA by providing for it in a written
partnership agreement.52 A significant change that the drafters of RUPA
debated, but eventually decided not to make, concerns the right of a
partner to dissociate in violation of the partnership agreement.53 UPA
section 3 1(2) allows a partner to dissolve at any time, even if it violates
the partnership agreement. RUPA retained this, a move that has been
strongly criticized by some as contrary to the expectations of most
partners.54
G. Conversions and Mergers
The last major change in RUPA is found in Article 9, which contains
helpful provisions dealing with the conversion of a partnership into a
limited partnership, or vice versa, and mergers of partnerships. These
provisions are entirely new, having no counterparts in UPA and
generally seem to be desirable innovations which should eliminate
existing uncertainties in the law concerning the consequences of the
change in form of a business entity.
III. SOME LESSONS FROM THE RUPA EXPERIENCE
RUPA's strongest points are its simplified and clarified treatment of
the subject of partnership property and its clarification of the authority
of partners to bind the partnership by providing for the filing of a
statement of authority. The clarifications of the law of conversions and
mergers are also helpful. On the other hand, RUPA's attempt to redefine
the fiduciary duties of partners and its requirement that a judgment
creditor exhaust his remedies against partnership assets before proceeding against a partner individually have proved quite controversial. Also,

51. Ribstein, supra note 39, at 52.
52. Id.

53. Id.
54. It can be argued that a partner who voluntarily enters into a partnership for a certain
time should not have the right to dissociate prior to the end of that term since it violates the
expectations of the partners at the time the partnership was formed. Furthermore, although a
damage remedy is theoretically available to the partnership, damages may in fact be difficult to
prove. The RUPA drafting committee's justification for retaining the status quo was that, since
a partnership exposes its participants to unlimited liability, a partner should be free to withdraw
at any time since unforeseen circumstances may arise during the course of the operation of the
partnership.
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RUPA's new provisions dealing with dissociation and dissolution are
needlessly complex and confusing. Further, the provision for retroactive
application of RUPA is troubling.
While it may be premature to conclude that the entire RUPA saga
was a failure, it appears unlikely at this time that the statute will achieve
the near universal acceptance of its predecessor. What are the lessons to
be learned from RUPA that might aid future uniform law revision
efforts?
A. Major Revisions of Uniform Legislation
Should Not Occur Unless There Is Widespread
Dissatisfactionwith the Existing Law
One of the fateful decisions made early in the revision process was
to undertake a major bottoms-up revision of UPA. While there was an
increasing number of minor areas of dissatisfaction with UPA, there did
not seem to be any urgent areas requiring immediate attention as was
true with the Uniform Limited Partnership Act when it was revised in
the 1970s." Thus, it may have been a foregone conclusion that any
wholesale revision of UPA would be doomed since there was no urgent
need for it, and thus it would be more difficult to persuade the states to
abandon the status quo. Piecemeal amendments of or additions to the
existing law would have been sufficient. Instead, RUPA is an entirely
new statute which runs more than twice the length of UPA. Furthermore, many of the widely touted changes, such as the move to the entity
theory of partnership and the revision of the dissolution and winding up
provisions, are more cosmetic than substantive. 6
B. Controversial Changes in Existing Uniform
LegislationAre Likely to Doom Its
Chancesfor WidespreadAdoption
In some areas where RUPA did make significant changes, those
changes were controversial. The best illustration of this is RUPA's
attempt to define more specifically the fiduciary duties of a partner.
While the existing language of UPA was vague, a significant body of
case law had developed so that the general character of a partner's
fiduciary duties could be determined with reasonable certainty in most
55. The changes made in that act contained much-needed clarifications in a number of key
areas which resulted in the widespread adoption of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(1976) by 48 states. HYNES, supra note 1, at 157-59.
56. For a defense of the revisions made in RUPA, see generally Donald J. Weidner &
John W. Larson, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW.

1 (1993).
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cases. However, RUPA's attempt to define the standard and to limit
fiduciary duties to those defined in the act met with criticism on both
sides. The "contractarians" charged that RUPA was too restrictive in its
attempt to limit the partner's ability to contract out of the default rule
of fiduciary duty. 7 On the other side, some charged that RUPA was
too limiting because it prohibited the courts from finding the existence
of fiduciary duties beyond those specifically defined by statute, and thus
it was feared that various types of inequitable conduct might escape
sanction if not specifically covered by the statute." In areas such as
this where no consensus exists on what the default rule should be, a
uniform act which takes a strong stand on a controversial issue may
have decreased chances of adoption or may be varied considerably from
the uniform model by individual states during the adoption process. 9
C. Unifonn LegislationDrafting Committees
Must Include Individuals with a Strong
Background in the Subject Matter
The NCCUSL Drafting Committee, while including many talented
individuals, did not include any persons from the academy who
specialized in partnership law. Thus, however skilled the committee
members were in drafting uniform legislation, they did not possess the
depth of experience in the relevant area of law which might have
expedited the drafting process. This is illustrated by the fact that no
authors of major casebooks or treatises in the area of agency and
partnership law served on the drafting committee although the ABA
advisory committee did include practitioners with considerable experience in partnership law. The difference in the collective experiential
background of the two committees may have contributed to the
substantial differences of opinion between them, which led to the
successive revisions of the statute after its original promulgation in the
fall of 1992.

57. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 39, at 45.
58. See Vestal, supra note 18, at 1559; Claire M. Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to
Appropriate Corporate Concepts: FiduciaryDuties and the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111 (1993).
59. For a compromise position which attempts to take into account the merits of both the
contractarian and the mandatory fiduciary duty points of view, see J. Dennis Hynes, Fiduciary
Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29
(1995).
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D. Uniform Legislation Should Be Widely Circulated
for Comment Priorto Release
Before the final version of any body of uniform legislation is
released, it should be circulated for comment by all interested parties in
order to build a base of support which will aid in its widespread
adoption. Perhaps because the initial drafting process was more lengthy
than anticipated and generated more controversy than was the norm, the
drafting committee chose not to have a lengthy comment period prior
to submitting the final draft to NCCUSL for approval in 1992. This is
surprising since that practice often has been followed with other drafts
of uniform legislation, and some commentators had urged that it be done
with RUPA. In retrospect, this decision was clearly a mistake since
many of the changes which took place in the various "final" versions of
RUPA released between 1992 and 1994 could have been avoided had
there been a period of comment prior to adoption. Also, the controversial nature of some of RUPA's significant changes-particularly its
treatment of fiduciary duties and its retroactivity-might have become
more apparent prior to its adoption.
Uniform legislation needs to have a broad base of support in order
to have a reasonable chance of surviving the rigors of the legislative
process in the several states and achieving the goal of widespread
adoption. The best way to achieve this is to ensure that all groups
having an interest in the legislation perceive that their voices have been
heard and their needs responded to during the drafting process. Perhaps
many provisions of RUPA were simply too controversial for a lengthy
comment period to have made any difference in the degree of support
received. However, given the embarrassing events of 1992-1994, clearly
a lengthy comment period at least could have allowed the drafting
committee to consider the opposing views prior to its adoption, thus
giving the act more credibility when finally released.
E. A Uniform Act Released During a Time
of Ferment Likely Does Not
Respond to the Consensus View
At the time the drafting committee was formed in 1987, probably no
one foresaw the revolution in unincorporated business entities that would
take place in the ensuing decade. Since Revenue Ruling 88-766" was
issued, we have seen the Limited Liability Company and lately the
Limited Liability Partnership and Limited Liability Limited Partnership

60. See Hynes, supra note 5, at 759.
61. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
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come into existence and achieve great popularity. By the time that
RUPA was being considered for adoption in the states in the early
1990s, it already was obsolete in at least one major respect-it did not
include provisions for limited liability partnerships. In Florida, RUPA
was adopted only after being amended to include provisions for limited
liability partnerships which, by definition, were non-uniform since there
were no such provisions in RUPA.6' The lesson is that it is difficult to
adopt uniform legislation in the midst of significant changes in tax law
and resulting changes in preferred forms of business organization.
F. The Wholesale Change in the Form of the
Statute Was Unnecessary
Although RUPA purports to make many significant changes in the
laws of partnership, many of the changes are more cosmetic than real.
For example, although the statute purports to declare a partnership an
entity, the partnership remains an aggregate in many of the most
important respects, including for purposes of personal liability of
partners for partnership debts and obligations and for purposes of federal'
income taxation. Similarly, the complicated changes in the dissolution
provisions do not, in fact, result in major changes in the rights of a
partner to dissolve the partnership upon the bankruptcy, death or
withdrawal of a partner or by a partner's own will even where exercising those rights violates the partnership agreement. Thus, the complexities of the new provisions may not be worth the minor substantive
changes wrought by them.
A well-developed body of case law existed under UPA and, because
of the substantial uniformity among the states, it was largely transferable
from one state to another. Where little authority existed in a particular
state, the courts typically gave considerable weight to interpretations of
the same provision in other jurisdictions. The costs in rendering such
precedent largely obsolete probably were not outweighed by the scope
of the benefits achieved by RUPA. In effect, those jurisdictions adopting
RUPA abandon a skeletal statute fleshed out by a considerable body of
case law in favor of a more detailed statute having essentially no body
of case law arising under it. It appears that most legislatures thus far
have not perceived this to be a good exchange.
The attempt to make RUPA retroactive also may have made it more
controversial than necessary.63 The drafters (presumably following the
precedent of developing various versions of the Model Business
62. FLA. STAT. § 620.78-.789 (1995).
63. Allan W. Vestal, Should the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1994 Really be
Retroactive?, 50 Bus. LAW. 267, 273-85 (1994).
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Corporation Act) probably thought that retroactivity would ensure
uniformity. However, whereas most state corporate codes contain a
clause expressly reserving to the state legislature the right to alter or
amend the code, UPA contains no such statement. Thus, major changes
in areas such as the fiduciary duty of partners, joint and several liability
of partners, and the need of a creditor to exhaust her remedies against
the partnership before proceeding against the individual assets of the
partners may alter significantly the expectations of the parties (and of
creditors) and perhaps raise constitutional due process issues.
In conclusion, RUPA contains many desirable changes. The changes
in the law regarding partnership property, the provisions for filing a
statement of partnership authority clarifying who may act on behalf of
the partnership, and the sections dealing with conversions and mergers,
among others, are desirable modifications; however, they easily could
have been incorporated into the framework of the existing UPA without
creating the uncertainties of a wholesale revision. Many of the other
changes, however, are largely cosmetic and could have been eliminated.
While it may be premature to conclude that RUPA has failed in its
original goal of supplanting the 1914 UPA, if true uniformity is to be
achieved, further drafts of RUPA must be forthcoming. Perhaps the
recent popularity of the new limited liability partnership form of
business entity, coupled with the 1996 amendments of RUPA authorizing such business entities, will, in the end, provide the impetus for many
states to approve RUPA. If that occurs there is hope that we may once
again have a truly uniform law of partnership.
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